The more I watch the kettle, the more pain.

— On 18 Feb 2022, I spoke to a FSM advisor in depth. I compared SDB to some of my best div stocks and realized that I have different expectations for each asset class:

• for div stocks, I have much longer holding windows [don’t want to be specific here, but at least 3Y]
• .. but I expect consistent DYOC. Many dividend superstars have a commitment to that.
• for SDB, I need liquidity: 1) time-bound dips. I also need 2) shallow dips, which is satisfied by this asset class.

It turned out SDB is failing expectation #1. The macro environment is not so drastically different from the past 30Y, so I blamed the fund managers (across the industry) for poor management.  Now I would blame the SDB asset class for failing my expectations, if the very best fund manager couldn’t deliver. That’s why I compared SDB to div stocks.

Now I think as an asset class, SDB is low-return, small loss, but not always better liquidity. For a fair comparison, FSM advisor reassured me that the dip would remain small (much better than stocks), and NAV recovery would arrive within the timeframe I set for my stocks.

One factor is selective cash-out (introduced in a 2021 mail to XR). FSM Advisor pointed out that most of the SDB issuers are reputable and consistent with coupon payments, but I am unable to see their coupon payout, and I can’t filter out the underwater bonds, and cash out the rest without loss. Selective sell-out would enhance liqudity of the SDB mufu.

Sugg/Plan 1: since there’s a high chance that Shenton SDB will decline further over the next few months, let’s sell $2k and watch the market. (Will maintain the deep-frozen 38k so as to capture the upswing.) If in a few months I see a 1% recovery in this mufu, we will progressively get back in, hoping to capture the upswing in time.

I discussed Sugg 1 with FSM advisor. She said many informed/patient investors would probably hold out for a recovery within 1-2Y (rather than timing the market), so I think it’s not stupid to hold. I told her that I would probably Feel better executing my Plan 1.

As of the call I had $4k invested in Shenton SDB. I did sell half at a price around 1.586. Now price is even lower, vindicating my decision.

— On 20 Dec 2021, I spoke to a lady at Fullerton regarding https://www.fullertonfund.com/fund/fullerton-short-term-interest-rate-fund-c/, followed by a chat with a FSM advisor.

This fund holds investment grade (average BBB+) short-duration (2-3 Y average duration) bonds including corp bonds, without HY bonds like those China property corp bonds.  Default risk is low with the underlying bonds.

Q: why the recent drop in NAV?
A: 1) rate hike and 2) China sentiment. The Fullerton lady emphasized that the sell-off in China depressed all market segments, as many investors dump all China corp bonds including investment-grade.

Q: what’s the projected impact due to upcoming rate hikes across the globe?
%%A: a CB announcement would (immediately?) translate to higher market yield i.e. lower NAV, but over time, the return on the fund will hopefully (am not so sure!) recover and catch up with the prevailing higher rate.

Q: based on historical chart, I would say every decline was followed by a reversal within a year. Average annual return is 2-2.5%, so can I assume this time round will be similar? Well, there are only a few historical occurences.
A: managers often hold IG bonds to maturity, and then deploy the repayment to buy new bonds, whose returns are higher during rate rise.  I guess that’s the mechanism of the reversal.

Jolt: However, how soon is that maturity? Average duration across existing bonds is 2Y+ ! So this mechanism won’t kick in within a year 🙁

If this fund can deliver 2%pa return as historically, then it is likely to beat my mtg interest cost. It would qualify as a parking spot for my borrowed dollars.

Jolt: However, the NAV could zigzag till late 2022.  Remember that once I sell #1173 I would have plenty of cash to capture the recovery. Now I think the recovery will not be over so soon. Instead of holding all the way through the recovery, (AA) means “sell now and buy after CompletionS”.

Q: When and how much is the expected mtg rate hike? Remember MBR is under OCBC in-house control.
A: As of Oct 2021, most mortgage brokers and bank executives agreed that the full impact of these global actions on Singapore will only be realized in 2023

Q: How fast and big are the hikes?
A: As of Dec 2021, the anticipated rate hikes (projected 2 to 3 in FY2022) is likely to end shy of 1%, rising at a quicker pace in FY2023 and FY2024, as widely polled by Economist.  The first rate hike may only occur in May 2022, as polled widely.

— Which option is safest? Earmark 42k for liquidation before exercise, to reduce quantum. Grab any chance for ABE over the next months, and liquidate incrementally.

AA) liquidate $42k at a small loss now, so as to reduce my housing loan quantum by $42k.
BB) keep the $42k position in FSM and wait for price recovery. The $42k portion of my housing loan will incur a floating interest rate of (projected) 1~1.5% for 12 months from mid-2022 to mid-2023.

FSM advisor is confident about the validity of AA. FSM advisor said BB is risky because mtg rate will probably go up amidst the “3 rate hikes”, but those SDBs could take a hit immediately and take a long time to recover, so I could end up losing on both sides. If those 42k positions decline while my mtg rate trends up, I would feel bad and have to hold longer. I may end up watching the 42k in pain, expecting it to outrun the mortgage rate.

She also pointed out the China sentiment may not get “resolved” so soon. It could depress the NAV of my 42k SBDs over 2022 or beyond.

— Q: is this oth?  Not oth because I care about loan burden, and monthly burn rate.
— soft close .. this fund includes 6%+ current allocation to cash. Too much cash. Mangers currently won’t accept new cash, and risk diluting future returns. I guess this means they are ready to buy new bonds at higher yield, but can’t find enough of them. If they use the idle cash to buy the current crop of new bonds, they would “buy” low coupon rate and stand to lose as yield rises.